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Amicus Curiae ConocoPhillips Company ("ConocoPhillips")1 hereby submits this 
brief in support of the appeal of ExxonMobil Corporation. The filing of this brief is 
contingent on the Court granting ConocoPhillips' motion for leave to file brief of an 
amicus curiae in accordance with Rule 25, Utah R. App. P. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
ConocoPhillips has reviewed the amicus brief filed by ChevronTexaco Exploration 
and Production Company and hereby adopts the Introduction and Background of that 
brief by reference, including the definition of the "Point of Sale Opinions," which are the 
two Tax Commission opinions that ruled oil and gas should be valued at the point of sale 
rather than at the well. ConocoPhillips agrees with the arguments set forth by 
ChevronTexaco, and requests the Court to reverse the Tax Commission decision for each 
of those reasons alone. ConocoPhillips also contends that the Tax Commission decision 
should be reversed for the following additional reasons. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Point of Sale Opinions Ignore The Legal Mandate That Any Doubts As to 
Statutory Interpretation Must be Resolved in ExxonMobil's Favor. 
As explained in the brief filed by ChevronTexaco, the plain language of the Utah 
Code clearly provides that oil and gas in Utah must be valued at the well rather than at the 
point of sale. In addition, even if the statutory language were not clear, to the extent there 
are any doubts in the minds of this Court regarding how the severance tax statutes should 
1
 ConocoPhillips Company was preceded in interest in the issues relevant to this 
case by both River Gas Corporation and Phillips Petroleum Company. For ease of 
reference, this brief will refer to the company through all periods as "ConocoPhillips." 
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be interpreted, that doubt must be resolved in favor of ExxonMobil because this case 
involves a taxing statute. This Court and the United States Supreme Court have clearly 
stated on many occasions that taxing statutes must be strictly construed in favor of 
taxpayers where doubtful. See Gould v. Gould. 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917) ("In the 
interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their 
provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge 
their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt 
they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen."); 
Airport Hilton Ventures. Ltd. v. Tax Comm'n. 976 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1999) 
(citations omitted) ("The statutes at issue operate as tax imposition statutes-they describe 
who will be taxed. We construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, 
leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent 
exists."); Salt Lake County v. Tax Comirin ex rel. Kennecott Corp.. 779 P.2d 1131,1132 
(Utah 1989) (citations omitted) ("It is an established rule in the construction of tax 
statutes that if any doubt exists as to the meaning of the statute, our practice is to construe 
taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer "); Ogden Union Railway and Depot 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 395 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah 1964) ("Problems of semantics are 
always difficult, especially where no specific meaning is assigned to them in the statutes, 
and we are to resolve doubts in favor of the taxpayer."); Butler v. Tax Comm'n, 367 P.2d 
852, 854 (Utah 1962) ("The Tax Commission as the taxing authority sustained its burden 
of establishing that the use tax was applicable. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to 
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prove the transactions came within the exemptions as it claims."); Pacific Intermountain 
Express Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 329 P.2d 650, 651 (Utah 1958) (citing Gould. 245 U.S. 
at 153) ("[T]axing statutes are to be construed strictly, and in favor of the taxpayer where 
doubtful."). 
The case of Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 845 P.2d 266,271 
(Utah App. 1993) is particularly important on this issue. As in the instant case, the Court 
of Appeals was trying to define "value at the well." In doing so, the Court stated: ff [ejven 
if we were to accept the Commission's statutory interpretation as plausible, [the 
taxpayer's] interpretation is likewise plausible. The statute would therefore be ambiguous 
and, in accordance with the foregoing rule [that "tax statutes are strictly construed in 
favor of the taxpayer"], we would accept [the taxpayer's] interpretation." 
Based on all of these cases, to the extent any doubt exists in the minds of this Court 
regarding the meaning of "value at the well," the Court must rule in favor of ExxonMobil. 
The Point of Sale Opinions ignored this legal mandate, and should thus be overturned by 
this Court. 
II. The "Long-Standing Interpretation" Position of the Point of Sale Opinions is 
Flawed. 
The Point of Sale Opinions justify valuing oil and gas at the point of sale based not 
on statute, but on "past administrative practice." R. at 289. The Commission contends 
that because the Auditing Division used the point of sale to value gas from 1990-2000 
and because it was "unchallenged" by industry during this period, it became the law. R. at 
288-94. While this Court has held that long-standing administrative interpretations are 
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sometimes entitled to great weight by courts (see Boards of Education v. Salt Lake 
County Comm'n. 749 P.2d 1264,1266 (Utah 1988); E.C. Olsen Co. v. Tax Comm'n. 168 
P.2d 324,332 (Utah 1946)), this "long-standing" principle does not apply to the Auditing 
Division's practice in the current case for at least three reasons. 
First, the long-standing principle applies only where there is "uncertainty or 
ambiguity in a statute." Boards of Education. 749 P.2d at 1266; see also West Valley City 
v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1000,1003 (Utah 1993). In the instant case, as explained 
in the briefs filed by ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, the statute is clear that oil and gas 
must be valued at the well rather than the point of sale. Accordingly, the statute is not 
uncertain or ambiguous, and a resort to Tax Commission policy is unnecessary. 
Second, even if the statute was ambiguous, this Court has specified that the 
"long-standing policy" principle applies only where the Tax Commissioners themselves 
have formally adopted a position, and that did not occur in this case. In E.C. Olsen. 168 
P.2d at 332, this Court said: 
[F]or the so-called practical interpretation to have any weight, it must be 
shown that it was an interpretation adopted by the Commission. The fact 
that something was done by a subordinate when it is not shown that the 
Commission had knowledge or acquiesced would in no case be such an 
interpretation as here meant. 
(Emphasis added.) See also Tax Comm'n v. Katsis. 62 P.2d 120 (Utah 1936) (holding 
that acts of Tax Commission employees are not acts of the "Tax Commission"). 
Through E.C. Olsen. this Court has clearly established that the Commissioners 
themselves are the only ones who can establish binding "long-standing policies." There is 
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a good reason for this. The Commissioners are appointed officials chosen for their 
experience, expertise and objectivity. If the Auditing Division could establish its own 
"long-standing" policy, it would create an Autocratic system where unelected, 
unappointed state employees could establish whatever policy they wanted. This would be 
the antithesis of a Democracy as a taxpayer would rarely win a case and there would be 
no check or balance on tax policy and assessments. 
In the current case, the Commission never knew of or acquiesced in the Division's 
"point of sale" analysis from 1990-2000. There was no Tax Commission rule, case, or 
bulletin espousing the position. Rather, the only published position adopted by the 
Commission was in Tax Commission Appeal No. 88-1676 where the Tax Commission 
ruled just the opposite, stating that "at the well means the gross value of those products at 
the point of their removal from the well. It does not mean the price obtained at some 
point downstream " R. at 380-85 (attached hereto as Exhibit A). If anything, this 
statement by the Commission was the long-standing agency interpretation. In any event, 
the Commission certainly never formally adopted the "point of sale" position between 
1990 and 2000. Consequentially, that position cannot be upheld as a "long-standing 
policy." 
The third reason the "long-standing" argument in the Point of Sale Opinions fails is 
because the Point of Sale Opinions are premised on the fact that the Auditing Division's 
"point of sale" position was followed and "unchallenged" by the industry between 1990 
and 2000 (R. at 288) and this is simply not the case. For instance, ConocoPhillips began 
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filing and paying severance tax based on the value at the well, as required by statute, in at 
least 1994.2 Unlike the ExxonMobil case, ConocoPhillips1 case before the Tax 
Commission did not arise through a refund request. It arose through an audit for the 
period 1994-1998. See Exhibit B. By assessing ConocoPhillips with an audit deficiency 
for this period, the Auditing Division has indirectly conceded that ConocoPhillips did not 
follow the long-standing Division position. Indeed, prior to ConocoPhillips being issued 
a statutory notice in 2000, ConocoPhillips did not have standing to challenge the faulty 
Division position. It was thus error for the Commission to rule against ExxonMobil 
based on a defective Division policy that was not the long-standing policy of the 
Commission, that was not followed by the industry, and that ConocoPhillips never had 
the opportunity to challenge until their audit was issued in 2000. 
For all three of these reasons, the Court should hold that the Point of Sale Opinions 
are in error, and should thus reverse the Tax Commission decision. 
2
 The Tax Commission was aware of this fact during the ExxonMobil case as 
ConocoPhillips filed an amicus brief explaining it. See R. at 232-39. ConocoPhillips also 
noted in its amicus brief at the Tax Commission that ChevronTexaco similarly began 
filing and paying severance tax based on the value at the severance point during the 
1990s. Hence at least two major taxpayers were not following the Division's point of sale 
position. Like ConocoPhillips, ChevronTexaco did not have standing to challenge the 
faulty Division position until its audit deficiency was issued, which for ChevronTexaco 
was in 2002. 
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III. The Tax Commission Should Have Ruled in Favor of ExxonMobil Given the 
Two-Two Tie Vote. 
Apart from the substantive merit-based arguments above, this Court should 
overturn the Tax Commission decision because only two commissioners voted against 
ExxonMobil. Granting victory to the government on a two-two Tax Commission tie vote 
violates both the Tax Commission's own rule and Utah common law. 
Tax Commission Rule R861-1A-21 ("Rule 21"), promulgated in 1997, provides as 
follows: 
The party charged with the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a 
statutory presumption shall prevail only if a majority of the participating 
commissioners rules in that party's favor. 
Under this rule, the Tax Commission should have ruled in favor of ExxonMobil 
given the two-two decision. The rule specifies that the party with "the burden of 
overcoming a statutory presumption" will prevail only if a majority of the participating 
Commissioners votes in that party's favor. In the current case, the government has the 
burden of overcoming a statutory presumption. As stated in section I. above, this case 
involves a taxing statute, which must be strictly construed against the government. The 
government thus has "the burden of overcoming a statutory presumption" and under the 
Commission's own rule, cannot prevail unless three commissioners rule in their favor. 
This did not occur in this case, so this Court should overturn the Commission decision. 
To the extent the Court believes Rule 21 supports the Commission's decision in 
this matter, the rule is invalid and should be struck down by this Court based on the same 
long-standing policy principle discussed above. Rule 21 was amended in 1997 for no 
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cogent reason, after at least 30 years where the rule provided that the taxpayer won with a 
tie vote. In 1967, the Tax Commission published its first set of procedural administrative 
rules. One of the 1967 rules stated: 
If the Commission votes two to two on any matter, the position of the 
petitioning taxpayer will be deemed to have prevailed, and the Commission 
will publish a decision or order to that effect, 
(See Exhibit C at p. 10.) The 1967 publication stated that it was "a conscious attempt to 
preserve as much as possible of present procedures and merely to reduce these to 
writing." (See Exhibit C at p. 3.) Based on this language, the rule was likely followed by 
the Commission for several years prior to 1967.3 In any event, the published rule was 
certainly on the Tax Commission books for 30 years, from 1967 until 1997, when the 
Commission amended it into the current Rule 21 without any impetus from the legislature 
or the courts. This departure in 1997 from the interpretation consistently followed by the 
Commission for at least 30 years, and probably much longer, cannot stand. This Court 
has expressly rejected such an action by the Tax Commission before. 
3
 It is plausible that the Tax Commission's "tie goes to the taxpayer" practice 
began in 1946 when this Court issued its decision in E.C. Olsen, 168 P.2d at 328-29, 
stating as follows: 
Rendering a decision as to the tax deficiency of plaintiff taxpayer is a 
transaction of Tax Commission business which when made requires that a 
quorum of the Commission be present and a majority of those present must 
agree in order for same to be an act of the Commission . . . If the so-called 
decision . . . shows that two commissioners did not participate in making it 
- it could not be enforced. Under such circumstances the taxpayer could 
attack in this court the purported decision as plaintiff is doing in this case.. 
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In Husky Oil Co. v. Tax Comm'n. 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976), the Tax 
Commission promulgated and applied an administrative rule from 1937 until 1971, when 
it amended the rule without any impetus from the legislature or the courts. This Court 
analyzed whether the 1971 amendment should be applied to a taxpayer and stated that: 
"prior determinations are entitled to great weight... and radical departures from 
administrative interpretation consistently followed cannot be made except for most cogent 
reasons." Id. at 1271. The Court then struck down the 1971 amendment for the reason 
that "[t]he Commission has made radical departures from an interpretation unchangingly 
followed by it for more than three decades" and "does not infuse congency into the 
reasons for those departures." Id 
As it did in Husky Oil, the Commission in the instant case made radical departures 
in 1997 from an interpretation unchangingly followed by it for at least 30 years, and 
probably much longer, with no cogent reason.4 Accordingly, to the extent the post-1997 
rule supports the Commission decision, this Court should strike it down and apply the 
long-standing Commission policy/rule that the taxpayer prevails when there is a tie vote. 
4
 In a January 14, 2003 open meeting before the Legislature's Administrative 
Rules Review Committee, two of the current tax commissioners discussed the 1997 rule 
change. Neither commissioner articulated a cogent reason for the rule change. To the 
contrary, Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson stated that "my philosophical bent, and 
probably that of the existing commissioners is that when we're talking about an income 
tax assessment, or a sales tax assessment, or a severance tax assessment, the prior rule 
probably made pretty good sense." 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Supreme Court should reverse the decision of 
the Tax Commission by holding that: (1) the Point of Sale Opinions are in error; (2) oil 
and gas in Utah must be valued at the well, or in other words, at the point it is extracted 
and brought to the surface of the earth, prior to entering the gathering lines; and (3) the 
Tax Commission should have ruled in favor of ExxonMobil given the two-two decision. 
DATED this 12th day of March, 2003. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
MarkK.Buchi 
Steven P. Young 
Attorneys for ConocoPhillips Company 
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eteric Snelson 
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Exhibit A 
p n :- "•, ?/$• 0 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION ' ^ ' ' ":'"' ^ y ^ 0 " 
P e t i t i o n e r s , 
AUDITING DIVISION OP THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
) 
Respondent. ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 88-1676 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah S t a t e Tax Commission for 
a formal hea r ing on Wednesday, May 24, 1989. Hearing the mat te r 
for and on behalf of the Tax Commission were R. H. Hansen, 
Chairman; Joe J3. Pacheco, Commissioner; and G. Blaine Davis, 
Commissioner and p r e s i d i n g Officer. Present and represent ing t h e 
were MmmHHm|BHHa^^M 
• • ^ B Present and representing the Respondent was Lee A. Dever, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Sased upon the evidence and testimony presented at t h e 
hearing, t he Tax Commission hereby makes i t s : 
FINDINGS OF FAHT 
I- The tax in question ie occupation tax. 
00280 
DIV20 
Appeal No. 88-X676 
2. The audit period in question i s January l, 1980 
through December 31. 1986. 
a. •^••^B||^HHH^HHH||H^^BBHHiHi 
(hereinafter col lect ively referred to as Petitioners) are separate 
.corporations, each incorporated under the law6 of Delaware. Each 
a subsidiary of f H H H H H B 
4. The Petitioners owned a number of oil and gas wells 
located within Utah. Some of those were located in what is 
to as t h e ^ m U f m ^ B Field. 
^ e m m Field i s a gas-condensate 
reservoir. The natural gas liquids (NGL's) produced from this 
field are delivered to a common carrier pipeline which, in turn, 
the to fllHIHI^Ifl^^HHHimiHiHIY 
'6. Pursuant to a contract entered into by the 
a n d ^ m ^ ^ I ^ H ^ a g r e e d , to purchase 
the NGL's produced by the Petitioners. The price paid b y f j ^ b 
V V a s based on the average monthly prices for such products as 
published by the flHHHHB Price Information Service. From 
that price, deductions were made for transportation, fractionation 
and marketing fees to arrive at the actual price paid by fl^^^Bb 
to the Petitioners. 
7. The amount of occupation tax paid by the Petitioners 
for the o i l and gas produced from t h e V ^ H H ^ B I Field was 
based upon the amount of money received from^(Punder the terms 
of the contract. 
- 2 -
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
For purposes of computing the occupation tax , the value 
of o i l or gas at the wel l shall be the value es tabl i shed under a 
bona fide contract for the purchase of the same, or in the absence 
of a contract, by the value at the well e s tab l i shed by the United 
States for royalty purposes (Utah Code Ann, S 59-5~67<2>(b)(i>). 
DECISION AND ORDER 
In the present case, the Petit ioners contend that the 
value at the well of the gas and oil'removed at the ^ g ^ j 
Field for purposes of determining the amount of occupation tax to 
be paid i s the net price paid b y ^ | B for those products 
under the terms of the contract. 
The Commission i s not persuaded by the arguments of the 
Petitioners. Section 59-5-67(3) states: 
o? y hS?SHn C ^ e t w ^ e n a P a r B n t a n d a subsidiary-company, or between companies wholly or partially owned by a 
JhaTrofS??^ ?J b e t r e e n ««"*<&«» otberwiS! afl i l iated 
bona Iids £ i L ? J » , v a l u ? o f m i n e « l s shall not be deemed 
DwLpJ?S«a?i 5B *u* v a i u e <?f "inerals specified is 
?alSe ?2 IL^ tht n ,J»»«l ,« reasonable fair cash 
shall'determine9?22V* * c o» t r o v e"y< the tax commission snaai determine the fair cash value of the mineral. 
Petitioners argue that under this subsection, the 
contract between them a n d g m
 i s a b o n a f i d e 
contract because the value established by the contract is 
proportionate to the fair market value.' That, however, is only 
half of the test to determine whether or not a contract i s bona 
fide for purposes of s
 5 9 - 5 -67 . The other half of the test 
- 3 -
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is found in § 59-5-67, which requires the value of oil and gas to 
be set "at the veil". It is this requirement that the 
Petitioners* pricing scheme fails to satisfy. 
Under the clBar and literal meaning of § 59-5-67, "at the 
well" means the gross value of those products at the point o'f-
their removal from the well. It does not mean the price obtained 
at some point downstream after deducting costs incurred for 
transportation, fractionation, and marketing fees. The position 
of the Petitioners also does not account for "shrinkage," or 
product which is lost in the process, because the quantities which 
are sold are smaller than the quantities which come through the 
meters at the top of the wells. Therefore, the Commission find6 
that the contract relied upon by the Petitioners to establish the 
value of the oil and gas produced at the wells was not a bone fide 
contract within the meaning of § 59-5-103. 
Having so decided, the Commission next turns to the issue 
of what the correct method of valuing of the oil and gas is, 
Again, S 59-5-103 provides the statutory guideline to be followed 
in making that determination. 
Under S 59-5-103, if a bona fide contract for the 
purchase of production of oil or gal does hot exist, the value of 
the oil or gas at the well is that which is established by the 
United States for royalty purposes (federal royalty method), From 
the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, it appears 
that although there was a federal lease within the field, which 
could have been used to establish the federal royalty price, the 
existence of that lease waa not known at the time of the audit, 
Thus, the federal royalty method was not applied, 
DF/23 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that 
the correct method for determining the value of the oil and gas 
removed from the veils located within t h e m H H M 
Pield is the federal royalty method. The Auditing Division is 
hereby ordered to adjust its audit and to compute the tax due 
based upon the federal royalty method. It is so ordered. 
tfc. DATED this 7 ^ day of Qbc,U/)UL 1990, 
BY ORDER OP THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
R.H' Hansen 
Chairman 
T^oe B. Pacheco 
commissioner 
NOTICE: You have ten (10) days after the date of the final 
to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days after 
the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a petition for 
judicial review. Utah Code Ann. SS 63-46b-l3U), 63-46b-l4<2) (a). 
PFI/jc/9Q45w 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div, 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Sam Vong 
Operations, Central Files 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Brad Simpson 
Oil 6 Gas Auditor 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Lee Dever 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
DATED this ..ft*-
 d a y o £ C^/ftjt, 1990, 
^ 
-6-
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Exhibit B 
Michael O.Leavitt 
GovcoBQf 
Olene S. Walker 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
210 North 1950 West Salt Lake City, Utah 841S4 
Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair 
R. Bruce Johnson, Commi&iio&er 
Palmer DcPffulis, Coiami^ on&r 
Maw B> Johnson. Comxmoaioaer 
Rodney G. MarreHi Executive Director 
River Gas Corporation 
511 Energy Center Blvd. 
Nortfaport,AL 35476 
August 25,2000 
Questions? Please contact: 
Heidi Bullock 
Phone No. (801) 297-4666 
Fax No. (801) 297-4799 
E-mail Address: hbnllock@tax^tale.ut.tis 
Account No- N1605 
Audit Period: Jan. 1,1994 to Dec. 31,1998 
STATUTORY NOTICE - SEVERANCE TAX 
The Auditing Division sent you a Preliminary Notice on June 26,2000. The 25-day period granted in 
the Preliminary Notice to review your proposed severance tax liability has expired. If you have questions 
concerning the audit process or the adjustments, please contact Heidi Bullock at (801) 297-4666- In addition, 
you can find information regarding your rigjits and obligations as a taxpayer and the Tax Commission's 
procedures for appeals and collections in the enclosed Utah Taxpayer Bill of Rights. 
Paving the Audit 
If you agree with the audit adjustments, the tax, penalty (if applicable) and interest as summarized on 
die enclosed audit report are due by September 24,2000. Make your check or money order payable to the Utah 
State Tax Commission- Enclose the payment along with the Utah Audit Payment Coupon in the envelope 
provided and mail to: 
Utah State Tax Commission 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134-2000 
Interest is calculated through September 24,2000. You can reduce the total interest charged by paying 
before September 24,2000. Please recompute interest to the date of payment using the daily interest amount 
shown on the enclosedaudit report 
Contesting die Audit 
If you do not agree with the audit adjustments, penalty (if applicable) and/or interest, the following 
procedures are available to you: 
Appeal Procedures: You may appeal directly to the Tax Commission according to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-501 and §63-46b-3. To protect and pursue your appeal rights, yon must file a 
Petition for Redetermination (fimn enclosed) within 30 days of die mailing date of this notice. The Tax 
Commission has no authority to consider your appeal if the petition is not filed within this 30-day 
period. Tie purpose of the petition is to submit in writing the area(s) of disagreement you have with the 
audit adjustment, penalty (if apphcable) and/or interest as well as the relief you are seeking. Attach a 
copy of this Statutory Notice letter to your Petition for Redetermination and return both to the 
Appeals Division. Note, the envelope provided for audit payment should not be used to file an appeal. 
Your Petition tor Redetermination should be returned to the following address: 
If you need an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, contact the Ihx Commission at (601) 297^3$11 or 
»if<»j> ^ n v iuArkhu? days for a response. »»«* M/—. 
River Gas Corporation 
August 25,2000 
Page 2 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeals Division 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134-6200 
The Appeals Division will acknowledge receipt of your Petition for Redetenninatiou, forward a copy to 
the Auditing Division for a written response and notify you and the Auditing Division of the next 
scheduled event in the appeal process. If you have questions about your appeal, call the Appeals 
Division at (801) 297-2280. 
Please note interest continues to accrue during the appeals process on any unpaid balance. 
Auditing Division Conference: Neither the filing of an appeal nor the scheduling of any proceeding 
during file appeal process prevents you from providing additional information to the Auditing Division 
or pursuing a Division Conference. This informal conference may be used to answer questions you 
have about the audit, to clarify, narrow and resolve issues involved, or to reach an agreement on the 
outstanding issues. You may request a Division Conference with the Auditing Division any time by 
contacting Heidi Bullock at (801) 297-4666. 
Please note that a request for a Division Conference does not protect your appeal rights* To preserve 
your right to appeal, a Petition for Redetermination must be filed as explained above. 
Failing to Respond to the Audit 
Unless you appeal the audit report as described above within the required 30 days, this Statutory Notice 
becomes a final assessment and Ml payment is due. If a petition is not filed or full payment is not received 
within 30 days of this notice, your case will be referred to the Collections Division of the Tax Commission 
((801)297-7703). They will collect the unpaid tax, penalty (if applicable) and updated interest In addition, a 
fkilure-to-pay penalty of 10 percent of the unpaid tax or $20, whichever is greater, will be assessed (Utah Code 
Arm. §59-l-401(2)(c)), 
Your prompt response is required to protect your rights. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OUUJ^ 
Craig SmWberg,CPA 
Director, Auditing Division 
2-2/smw 
Enclosures 
ALL COMMUNICATION REGARDING INSTRUMENTS TENDERED AS FULL SATISFACTION OF A 
DISPUTED DEBT MUST BE DIRECTED TO "UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, P.O. BOX 2998, SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2998." 
UTAH SEVERANCE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY 
RIVER GAS CORPORATION 
FOR THE PERIOD 
01/01/1994-12/31/1998 
River Gas Corporation 
511 Energy Center Blvd-
Northport,AL 35476 
Report Date: 8/25/2000 
Account Number: N1600 & N1605 
Field Name: Drunkard Wash 
Field Number 046 
Examining Officer: 
Heidi Bullock 
Exhibit A 
Exhibit B 
Total 
*Note: Interest Computed To: 
Daily Interest Amount: 
$134,110.74 
$242,472.82 
$376,583,56 
$0.00 
$0,00 
$38,444.50 
$30,963.59 
$0.00 
09/24/00 
$72.22 
$69,408.09 
$172,555,24 
$273,436.41 
$445,991.65 
Preliminary Notice Dated 06/26/00 
The following summarizes the severance tax adjustments. 
1. River Gas Corporation (RGC) undemeported transported volume on the Severance Tax Return In 1994 and 1995. The volume RGC 
reported was net of royalty volume and exempt production volume. 
2. RGC also underreported product value. The company deducted separator repairs, compressor rentals, electric power compression, 
and compression station expenses. These are not allowable deductions. Gas transportation costs were allowed. 
3. RGC did not fully claim exempt values applicable to stripper and first six months production. The exemption value deducted was 
calculated from net product value rather than gross product value. 
4. RGC ovenreported exempt royalties for 1994 and 1995. The 12-5% royalty rate was used to compute exempt royally value for those 
years, 
5. RGC did not file an annual return for 1997 and 1998. The company did, however, file quarterly installment returns for both years* 
6. RGC underreported workover credit applicable to its 1998 Severance Return. 
7. Exhibits A, A-1, B, and B-1: 
Exhibits A-1 and B-1 summarize the adjustments from each schedule, and Exhibits A and 8 compute the additional tax, penalty (if 
applicable), and interest The amounts are listed by Filing periods. Exhibit A includes periods 1994-1996 and Exhibit B Indudes periods 
1997-1998. See Utah Code Annotated Sections 59-1-401 (5)(a) and 59-1-402 for penalty and interest application information. 
8. Under Utah Code Section 59-1-401 (1)(a), "The penalty for failure to file a tax return within the time prescribed by law including 
extensions is the greater of $20 or 10% of the unpaid tax due on the return." Since this was your company's first audit, penalty will not 
be assessed for not filing your Annual Returns. However, if this happens in the future penalty will be assessed. 
Statutory Notice Dated 08/25/00 
The Preliminary Notice and Report dated June 26, 2000 is unchanged by this Statutory Notice with the exception of updating the amount 
of interest due. 
Exhibit C 
v^> 
V-^N 
\*T\ 
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PREFACE 
This Code of Administrative Procedure has been prepared re-
sponsive to what we feel has been a continuing need to have a 
systematic approach to that part of the Tax Commission activity 
which involves exercise of its regulatory and adjudicatory powers. 
The idea for such a code was first conceived by Orville Gunther, 
then chairman of the State Tax Commission, in the early 1960s. 
His awareness of this need resulted in part from comments and 
suggestions made by practitioners before the Commission and others 
familiar with its problems and procedures, and in part by his own 
increasing realization and that of his Commission colleagues of the 
benefits such a formalization of practice might bring. 
Our primary motivation in promulgating this code, and it was 
officially adopted and promulgated as a regulation on the 27th day 
of February, 1967, is to assure that matters brought before the Com-
mission for its action receives as expeditious, thorough and impartial 
consideration and review as it is within our power to give. We recog-
nize that even a simple administrative structure sometimes appears 
to be a maze to those not initiated into its mysteries. To the degree 
that this code will offer a guide into this structure, we believe that 
it will be of value. 
Those who have practiced extensively before the Commission 
will find little here that is revolutionary. There has been a conscious 
attempt to preserve as much as possible of present procedures and 
merely to reduce these to writing unless a revision or clarification 
has seemed clearly preferable. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first procedural code of 
this magnitude which has been prepared by any agency of the State 
of Utah. While we are pleased that the Tax Commission is acting 
in a pioneer capacity in this area, it is our hopeful anticipation and 
trust that other administrative bodies in state government might 
take similar steps. 
There has been before the legislature of this state in recent 
years an administrative procedural code which would govern practice 
before all state agencies. It is clear that the enactment of this legis-
lation or, for that matter, any substantive taxation legislation, might 
supersede or at least modify provisions of this code. Because of this, 
it is our intent to periodically review and modify this code to make 
it conform to changes in law, and to amend it in other ways when 
our experience shows that a particular provision was not carefully 
considered as it might have been. 
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An exhaustive review of the Federal Code of Administrative 
'rocedure, Model State Administrative Procedure Act, and admini-
trative procedural codes existing in other states was made in con* 
lection with the formulation of this document. Some of the ideas 
nd procedures set forth herein are derivative from these codes; many, 
owever, do not even roughly correspond to provisions found in the 
iws or regulations of other jurisdictions, but are responsive to pecu-
ar Utah problems. The major portion of the research and drafting 
f this code was done by M. Reed Hunter of the Office of the Attor-
ey General. 
We do not purport to have solved all problems which might 
rise in practice before this agency, but hope we have brought into 
eing a code that will deal satisfactorily with most of them without 
xceeding the regulatory power granted the Commission by the Utah 
institution and the legislative branch of our state government. 
We wish to express our appreciation to our predecessors on this 
lommission, the tax section of the Utah State Bar, the Attorney 
General and several of his assistants, officers of the various depart-
lents of the Commission, and all others who have encouraged us 
1 preparation of this code and who have rendered valuable assistance 
1 the process of its review, finalization and publication. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
Ransom Quirm 
A. Pratt Kesler 
G. Douglas Taylor 
Vernon L. Holman 
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STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
Section 1 — Definitions 
1-1. As used in this Code: 
(a) "Commission" shall mean the State Tax Commission of 
the State of Utah. 
(b) "Department" shall mean any subdivision of the State Tax 
Commission, including, but not restricted to, the auditing 
division, the property tax division, the motor vehicle divi-
sion, the motor vehicle business administration division, 
and the collections division. 
(c) "Officer" shall mean an employee of the Commission in a 
supervisory or responsible capacity. 
(d) "Party" shall mean any individual, partnership, association, 
or corporation. 
(e) "Conference" shall mean an informal meeting of a party 
or parties with departmental heads or officers or employees 
designated by departmental heads. 
(f) "Regulation" shall mean an officially adopted Commis-
sion ruling of general prospective effect in connection with 
laws the Commission is charged to administer and Com-
mission procedures, policies and practices. 
(g) "Regulatory power" shall refer to the Commission's power 
to adopt such regulations. 
(h) "Hearing" shall mean a proceeding, formal or informal, at 
which a party or parties may present evidence and argu-
ments to the Commission in relation to a particular order 
or regulation. 
(i) "Order" shall mean the whole or any part of the final 
disposition, with specific retrospective effect, by the Com-
mission of any particular controversy or factual matter 
presented to it for its determination, or the document re-
flecting the same. 
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w ..^„~*>~*^V/IJ. oxiAn. mean v^ummxssion process m tfte 
formation of an order. 
(k) "Quorum" shall mean three members of the Commission. 
(1) "Record" shall mean that body of documents and exhibits 
from a hearing submitted for review on appeal. 
(m) "Appeal" shall mean appeal from an order of the Commis-
sion to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Section 2 — Regulatory Power 
2-1. POLICY AND SCOPE. In accordance with the responsibil-
ity placed upon it by law, the Commission shall enact appropriate 
rules and regulations. These rules and regulations shall prescribe 
practices and procedures for the Commission and other state and 
:ounty officials and agencies over which the Commission has super-
visory power and interpret laws the Commission is charged with ad-
ninistering, when such interpretation is deemed necessary and in 
he public interest. 
1-2. PREPARATION. In the preparation of rules and regulations 
he Commission may refer to appropriate materials and consult such 
>arties as it deems advisable, whether or not such persons are em-
>loyees of the Commission. Drafts of proposed regulations may be 
ubmitted to the Office of the Attorney General for examination as 
o legality and form. 
r3. NOTICE AND HEARING. The Commission may publish, 
y means of local communications, notice of its intent to exercise 
:s regulatory power in a particular area. Notice therein will be given 
f a scheduled hearing or hearings not sooner than 15 days after 
ich notice, at which hearing or hearings any party who would be 
jbstantially affected by such exercise may present argument in sup-
ort thereof or in objection thereto. Such notice and hearing or 
earings will be instituted only when the Commission deems them 
) be of substantial value and in the public interest, and such notice 
id hearing or hearings shall not be prerequisite to the Validity of 
ly regulation. 
4. ADOPTION. Rules and regulations will be adopted by the 
ommission at formal meetings with at least a quorum of commis-
:>ners present. Adopted rules and regulations will be written, dated 
id signed by the commissioners present and entered into the offi-
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available for examination by interested member of the public at the 
Commission offices. This proceeding and no other will be neces-
sary for validity. 
2-5. EFFECTIVE DATE. Unless otherwise specified in the regu-
lation, the effective date thereof will be 20 days after the date of the 
Commission meeting at which the regulation was adopted. 
2-6, PUBLICATION. Copies of adopted regulations will be pre-
pared and made available to interested parties requesting the same. 
Such regulations shall also be published periodically in booklets and 
bulletins prepared by the Commission. It shall be the policy of the 
Commission to publish all new regulations at the time of each com-
pilation of regulations in the particular area; no regulation, however, 
shall be deemed invalid by failure to prepare copies for distribution 
or to publish in the manner herein described. 
2-7. PETITIONS FOR EXERCISE OF REGULATORY POW-
ER. The Commission may be petitioned to exercise its power to 
adopt a regulation of general prospective import. Such petition may 
be submitted in writing by any party who would be substantially and 
directly affected by such regulation. The Commission will have 
wide discretion in this area and will exercise this regulatory power 
upon petition only when it deems that such exercise would be of 
substantial value to the citizens of Utah. If the Commission accepts 
such a petition, it may adopt such regulation as it deems appro-
priate; however, the petitioning party may submit a proposed regu-
lation for the consideration of the Commission. If the Commission 
acts favorably upon such a petition, it will adopt and publish the 
regulation in the manner hereinabove described, and in addition 
notify the petitioner of such adoption by mail at his last known 
address. If the Commission declines to act on such petition, it will 
so notify the petitioning party in the same manner. 
2-8. REPEAL AND AMENDMENT. The procedure above de-
scribed for the enactment of regulations shall also be followed for 
the amendment or repeal of existing regulations. 
Section 3 — Departmental Conferences 
3-1. DEPARTMENTAL CONFERENCES- Any party directly 
affected by a Commission action or contemplated Commission action 
may request a conference with the supervisor or designated officer of 
7 
uic department involved in relation to such action. Such request 
may be either oral or written, and such conference will be conducted 
in an informal manner in an effort to clarify and narrow the issues 
and problems involved. The party requesting such conference will 
be notified of the result of the same, either orally or in writing, in 
person or through counsel, at the conclusion of such conference or 
within a reasonable time thereafter. Such conference may be held 
at any time prior to an informal hearing, whether or not a petition 
for such informal hearing has been filed. 
Section 4 — Petitions for Hearings 
4-1. WHO MAY PETITION, Any party directly and adversely 
affected by an action or a contemplated action of the Commission, 
wishing the Commission to exercise its adjudicatory power on his 
behalf, may petition for a hearing. Such a party may be one against 
whom a tax assessment has been made, one under a contractual 
obligation to pay a tax assessed against another, one against whom 
security is being sought, one desiring the Commission to exercise 
powers granted to it in his favor, etc. 
4-2. * TIME FOR PETITION. Petitions for hearings will be filed 
within the time limits prescribed by the Utah Code. If no specific 
' statutory section provides to the contrary, however, petition for hear-
ing should be filed within*60 days of tie time the party received 
notice of the Commission action or contemplated action. 
4-3. CONTENTS. A petition for hearing need not be in any par-
ticular form, but shall be in writing and contain the following: 
(a) Name of petitioner. 
(b) Particular tax involved and period of alleged liability if ap-
propriate. 
(c) If the petition results from a letter or notice from the Com-
mission, such petition will include the date of said letter 
or notice and the originating department or officer. 
(d) Particular relief or action sought. 
(e) If a particular statute is relied upon by petitioner, reference 
to that statute. 
(f) Statement of facts and summary of arguments and author-
ities relied upon. This requirement need only be met upon 
Commission request, but such statement may be included 
by the petitioner in his petition if he chooses. 
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4-4. EFFECT OF IRREGULARITY. The Commission will not 
deny a petition because of irregularity in form or content, but may 
require an amended or substitute petition meeting the requirements 
of this section when such defects are present. 
4-5. DENIAL. If the Tax Commission denies a petition for a hear-
ing, such denial will be communicated to the petitioner in writing 
at its last known address. The Commission may deny the petition 
if it is not filed in a timely manner or if the Commission is not a 
proper board or agency to consider the same or if the Commission 
cannot grant the relief sought or if it is determined that the peti-
tioner is not a party who would be directly and adversely affected by 
the Commission action or contemplated action complained of. Such 
denial will be an appealable order. 
4-6. NOTICE OF HEARING. If the Commission accepts such 
E3tition, it will notify the petitioning party by ordinary mail at its st known address of date, time and place of the hearing scheduled 
in response to such petition at least 10 days prior to the date thereof. 
Section 5 — Adjudication 
5-1. HOW INSTITUTED. Adjudicatory hearings may be ini-
tiated as provided in Section 4 by a parly directly and adversely 
affected by an action or a contemplated action of the Commission, 
or by the Commission as provided by law. 
5-2. TYPES. Adjudicatory hearings will be of two types, informal 
and formal. All initial petitions for hearings will be for informal 
hearing, which will precede formal hearings in each case. If a party 
is not satisfied with the determination made by the Commission 
from the informal hearing, he may petition for a formal hearing in 
the same manner as provided in Section 4. 
5-3. WAIVER OF FORMAL HEARING. If there exists no sub-
stantial factual controversy, and if an informal hearing has been held 
and decision therein rendered, and all parties, including the Com-
mission, agree to such waiver, the formal hearing in any controversy 
may be waived. In case of such waiver, the Commission will enter 
an order of the type described in' subsection 5-12, from which appeal 
may He. 
5-4. QUORUM. All adjudicatory hearings will be before a quorum 
of the Commission, except as provided in subsection 9-3 or as other-
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wise specinea t>y statute. It three commissioners hear a matter, they 
may render a decision on that matter, and if all three agree, that 
decision will be the decision of the Commission. If the three com-
missioners split two to one, the decision of the two shall be the de-
cision of the Commission in an informal hearing; in a formal hear-
ing, however, the fourth commissioner may participate in the de-
cision even though he was not present at the hearing upon familiariz-
ing himself with the record and with the arguments made. If he 
does not choose to participate, the decision of the majority of those 
present will be a binding Commission decision. If the Commission 
yotes two to two on any matter, the position of the petitioning tax-
payer will be deemed to have prevailed, and the Commission will 
publish a decision or order to that effect. 
WL DISQUALIFICATION. A commissioner may disqualify hiiop 
einsmn ruling in any particular hearing because of a conflipt'of 
nterestXif for any other reason he feels he would not bp^tble to 
nake a fulhand impartial determination of the probleja^efore the 
Commission. If«a commissioner does not disqualifvjaimself, he may 
>e disqualified fortifee same reasons by a majorijy'vote of the other 
commissioners upon motion of a party app^afmg before the Com-
nission, but no commissioner shall institute any such motion. A 
commissioner who is disqualified maj^attend a hearing and, if neces-
ary, count towards the requirec£><monini listed in subsection 54, 
yen though he shall have no^right tbsjrote. In no event shall a de-
ision of the Commission>e made by l^ t iban two commissioners, 
f two or more commissioners are disqualified^the Commission may 
ppoint a hearingpflScer or hearing officers who^stoll have the same 
ote in thepp^5eeding as a commissioner who hitesnot been dis-
[ualified. TKe hearing officer shall be a resident of T5t^ h, not an 
mplwpeTof the State Tax Commission, who is familiar with taxa-
ioi^law and practice, and his power and authority shall not efctoid 
€yond the single adjudication for which he is appointed. ^ ^ 
-6. FAILURE OF APPEARANCE. If a party fails to appear 
dthout notification of his intended absence for a hearing at the 
me and place scheduled, after notice of the same has been given 
im as provided by law and by subsection 4-6, the hearing will be 
scheduled and notice given to such party in the same manner of 
le new setting. If the party again fails to appear without notifica-
on, the Commission will dismiss his petition, if the hearing is based 
pon a petition, or take whatever action it deems just and approp-
riate if the hearing was initiated by the Commission. Such dis-
lissal or action will be subject to reconsideration and reopening 
ithin 30 days but only for good cause shown, and petitioner shall 
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have the burden to establish that he did not intentionally or negli-
gently fail to appear at the scheduled hearings. 
5-7. CONTINUANCES. Any party will be allowed one continu-
ance upon request of a scheduled hearing for any reason he deems 
sufficient. Any party will be allowed an additional continuance if he 
can show that some special circumstance, such as newly discovered 
evidence of significant bearing, or sickness or unavailability of wit-
nesses, justifies the same and that the request is not frivolous or 
merely to delay. In no event shall there be more than two con-
tinuances of a hearing unless all parties, including the Commission, 
stipulate thereto. Continuances will be for a reasonable time only. 
5-8. CONSOLIDATION. The Tax Commission may allow con-
solidation of matters when the same tax assessment or series of assess-
ments are involved in each, or where the fact situations and the legal 
questions presented are virtually identical. The Commission, how-
ever, will not force such consolidation, and each party will be en-
titled to a separate hearing if he so desires, unless this would involve 
such a number of hearings on a single fact situation or point of law 
that expeditious tax administration and the public interest would 
not be served. The Commission will have a wide discretion in allow-
ing or refusing to allow consolidation and will exercise its discretion 
in the interests of justice and fairness to the entire citizenry of the 
state. No consolidation of matters shall be required when such con-
solidation would have the effect of eliminating any privilege recog-
nized by law. 
5-9. INTERVENTION. The Commission will allow intervention 
on the same basis as above described for consolidation of matters, 
upon the petition of the party seeking intervention as provided in 
Section 4. 
5-10. SUBPOENA POWER. The Commission is specifically 
granted in Section 59-5-46(17), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the 
power to subpoena witnesses to give testimony and produce docu-
ments and other tangible evidence. The Commission will exercise 
this power in a reasonable manner in behalf of any party appearing 
before it in a formal or informal hearing, when such witnesses and/or 
documents are deemed essential.to the fair and complete adjudica-
tion of the problem before it. Service of the subpoena will be made 
by the sheriff of the county in which service is made or his agent, or 
by a duly appointed representative of the Tax Commission and, in 
all other respects, as provided by law. 
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